State Protection of the Right to Work by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 29 
Number 2 Volume 29, May 1955, Number 2 Article 5 
May 2013 
State Protection of the Right to Work 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1955) "State Protection of the Right to Work," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 29 : No. 2 
, Article 5. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss2/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
application of either domiciliary or non-domiciliary law. The effect
of this shifting rule is to impose a geographic limitation on the ap-
plicability of the New York Rule against Perpetuities. The Rule ap-
parently applies only where a resident of New York establishes a
trust to be administered in New York.55 Depending on the weight
of the Sainuels case, however, non-charitable testamentary trusts may
be excluded from this rather ideal limitation.
The New York Rule against Perpetuities will not apply to an
inter vivos trust of personal property with a foreign situs; nor will
it apply if the beneficiary of a testamentary trust is a foreign charity
and the trust is to be administered in another jurisdiction. If, in the
latter case, the beneficiary is not a charity, the law can only be
described as uncertain.
STATE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO WORK
Introduction
Governmental policy in the United States, echoing what is un-
doubtedly the sentiment of most Americans, has sought to encourage
competition in industry. This has required the enactment of legisla-
tion against those who would combine in order to raise artificially the
price of their goods, either directly or indirectly. Such laws, however,
impinge upon the liberty of those whom they affect by preventing
them from contracting as they wish. It is therefore necessary to sub-
ject all such legislation to the closest scrutiny to determine whether
or not the liberty which it preserves is greater than that which it
restricts.
In recent years many states have enacted so-called "right-to-
work" 1 laws, which prohibit the conventional union shop contract
and other union-security devices. These statutes would appear to
come within the general category of legislation the purpose of which
is the maintenance of competition, since the underlying rationale is
5 See 2 WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1325 (3d ed. 1905).
1 Terminology in this field is fraught with partisan overtones. Union
leaders prefer to call these enactments "anti-union-security" laws, rather than
"right-to-work" statutes. This is in harmony with their use of the term "union
security" rather than "closed shop," "union shop," "maintenance of membership,"
etc. It cannot be denied that the term "right-to-work" is misleading, if it is
understood to mean a literal right to be employed. Such a "right," though for-
eign to American political concepts, is common among authoritarian regimes.
E.g., ARGENTINA CONsT. Art. XXXVII, § 1(1); Spain: Labor Charter, Art. I,§ 8; U.S.S.R. CoNsT. Art. CXVIII. In this article the terms "right-to-work"
and "union security" will be employed in the interest of brevity and uniformity.
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that the law should not permit individuals to combine for the purpose
of monopolizing the labor market in an industry.
2
Regulation of Union Security
The discussion over the dosed and union shop is almost as old
as the Republic. The first American trade unions, formed at the end
of the eighteenth century, included among their goals the ". . . estab-
lishment of the principle of exclusive union hiring, later known as the
'closed shop.' "1 Contracts containing union-security provisions have
been received with varying degrees of acceptance by the courts,4 with
New York representing a minority view in upholding such agree-
ments.5 In the federal sphere, powerful stimulus was given to the
use of such clauses by the passage of the Wagner Act, 6 in which Con-
gress expressly recognized their validity.7 Some states thereafter
enacted similar legislation8 With the passage of time and the in-
crease in union strength, however, the belief became widespread that
governmental fostering of union security did more harm than good.
Accordingly, when the Taft-Hartley Act 9 was passed, it prohibited
the closed shop.10 The Act permitted the union shop, under which
the employee could be required, as a condition of continued employ-
2 The right-to-work statutes, by their terms, are directed at "monopolies"
and "conspiracies." E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 375(2) (Supp. 1953); LA. REv.
STAT. tit. 23, § 882 (Supp. 1954); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 95-79 (Michie,
1950) ; VA. CODE ANN. tit. 40, § 40-69 (1950).
3 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVE-
MENT 1 (Bulletin No. 1000, 1950).
4 See 1 TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND Co.Lzcrniv BARGAINING § 170 (1940).
5 Ibid. See Williams v. Quill, 277 N.Y. 1, 12 N.E.2d 547, appeal dismissed,
303 U.S. 621 (1938). Such contracts were given substantial recognition in
New York in the early years of this century. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Cohen, 183
N.Y. 207, 76 N.E. 5 (1905). Previously, they had been invalid in New York.
See Curran v. Galen, 152 N.Y. 33, 46 N.E. 297 (1897) ; cf. People ex rel. Gill
v. Smith, 5 N.Y. Crim. R. 509 (Ct. Oyer & Ter. 1887).
649 STAT. 449 (1935).
7"... [N]othing in this Act . ..or in any other statute of the United
States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor
organization . . . to, require as a condition of employment membership
therein. . . ." 49 STAT. 452, § 8(3) (1935). Indeed, it was indicated that the
refusal of an employer to bargain with a union for union security was an
unfair labor practice under the Act. See Alexander Milburn Co., 62 N.L.R.B.
482, 509-511 (1945). Ultimately, after its repeal, Section 8(3) was construed
to be merely a disclaimer on the part of the Federal Government of any hos-
tility to union-security agreements, rather than a bestowal of the right to make
such contracts where they violated state law. See Algoma Plywood & Veneer
Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 301 (1949).8 E.g., N.Y. LABOR LAw §704(5); CONN. GEN. STAT. §7392(5) (1949);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.6(c) (Purdon, 1952).
961 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1952).
1061 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(3) (1952). It is an unfair
labor practice, under the Taft-Hartley Law, to enter into a closed shop con-
tract. Red Star Express Lines v. NLRB, 196 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1952).
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NOTES
ment, to join a union on or after the thirtieth day of work.:" This
provision is, by virtue of Section 14(b) ,12 only applicable where state
law does not prohibit the union shop contract. It is this latter section
which has stimulated the enactment of right-to-work laws by the
legislatures of various states.
Eighteen states now have right-to-work laws.'3 These enact-
ments vary widely, both in form and in content. In some states they
are contained in the state constitution; in others they are included as
statutory provisions. Characteristically, they commence by declaring
it to be the policy of the state that no person's employment should be
conditioned upon membership or non-membership in a labor organ-
ization.1 4  Subsequent clauses ordinarily proscribe the closed shop,
the union shop, and "employment monopolies," as well as contracts
which require or which prohibit union membership as a condition of
employment.15 Contracts providing for the compulsory payment of
union dues are also outlawed.' 6 In some states the statute prohibits
any deduction of union dues from the employee's pay envelope except
1161 STAT. 140, § 8(a)(3) (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1952). It has
been suggested that the union-shop provision of the Taft-Hartley Law is un-
constitutional, although no case has yet reached the Supreme Court on the
point. See Lawrence, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Dec. 13, 1954, p. 17, col. 1.
12 "Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or
application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or
application is prohibited by State or Territorial law." 61 STAT. 151, § 14(b)
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1952).
13 ALA. CoDE tit. 26, § 375 (Supp. 1953) ; ARiz. CoNsT. Art. II, § 35, ARiz.
CoDE ANN. § 56-1302 et seq. (Supp. 1952); ARK. CoNsr. AMEND. XXXIV(1),
ARo. STAT. ANN. § 81-201 et seq. (1947); FLA. CONST., Declaration of Rights
§ 12; GA. CoDE ANN. tit. 54, §§ 54-902 et seq., 54-9922 (Supp. 1951); IowA
CoDE ANN. c. 736A (1950); LA. Rav. STAT. tit. 23, §§ 881-888 (Supp. 1954);
Laws of Miss. 1954, c. 249, § 1; NEB. CoNsT. Art. XV, § 13, NEB. REv. STAT.§§ 48-217, 48-219 (1952); NEV. CoMP. LAws § 10473 (Hillyer, 1929); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 95-78 et seq. (Michie, 1950); N.D. Ray. CODE tit. 34,§ 34-0114 (Supp. 1953); S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 40, § 40-46 (Supp. 1954); S.D.
CODE § 17.1101 (Supp. 1952) ; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 11412.8-11412.12 (Williams,
Supp. 1954) ; Tax. STAT. arts. 5154c, 5207a (Vernon, 1947) ; VA. CODE ANN.
tit. 40, § 40-68 et seq. (1947), §§ 40-74.1 et seq. (Supp. 1954). This year Utah
also enacted a right-to-work law. See N.Y. Times, March 20, 1955, p. 50,
col. 3. England had such a statute from 1927 until 1946, but it applied only
to public employees. Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1927, 17 & 18
GEo. V, c. 22, § 6, repealed by Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1946,
9 & 10 GEO. VI, c. 52.
14 E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 26, §§ 375(1), 376 (Supp. 1953); IOWA CODE ANN.
c. 736A, § 736A.1 (1950); LA. REV. STAT. tit. 23, § 881 (Supp. 1954); S.C.
CODE ANN. tit. 40, § 40-46 (Supp. 1954).
25 E.g., LA. REV. STAT. tit. 23, §§ 882, 884 (Supp. 1954); Laws of Miss.
1954, c. 249, § I(b), (c), (d); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 95-79 et seq. (Michie,
1950) ; VA. CODE ANN. tit. 40, § 40-69 et seq. (1950).
16 E.g., A"A. CODE tit. 26, § 375(5) (Supp. 1953) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-202
(1947); GA. CODE ANN. tit. 54, § 54-904 (Supp. 1951); IowA CODE ANN.
c. 736A, § 736A.4 (1950).
1955]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
on his request.17 Two states make it unlawful to threaten with injury
any person who refuses to join a union.' 8 Some of the states exclude
from the coverage of their statutes those employees who are covered
by the Railway Labor Act,' 9 since that statute contains no provision
comparable to Section 14(b). The right-to-work statutes have been
held constitutional under both state 20 and federal 21 constitutions.
The remedies provided in the various states for the enforcement
of these laws are both civil and criminal. Virtually all of the right-
to-work laws declare that contracts which contravene their provisions
are void or unenforceable. 22 Parties who are injured by their vio-
lation are permitted to enjoin the harmful acts, recover damages, or
both.23  The violation itself is a misdemeanor, 24 and substantial pen-
alties are included in some of the statutes. 25
Few other state laws have provoked as much debate as have the
right-to-work statutes. While they have been warmly supported in
principle by business associations,2 6 union organizations have unre-
17 E.g., GA. CoDE ANN. tit. 54, § 54-907 (Supp. 1951); IowA CODE ANN.
c. 736A, § 736A.5 (1950) ; S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 40, § 40-46.4 (Supp. 1954).
18 ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 56-1304 (Supp. 1952) ; S.D. CODE § 17.1101(2) (Supp.
1952).
1944 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1952). E.g.,
IOWA CODE ANN. c. 736A, § 736A.8 (1950); Laws of Miss. 1954, c. 249(h).
One court has held that the provision of the Railway Labor Act which permits
a union shop is unconstitutional. See Sandsberry v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe
Ry., 25 LABOR CASES 1 68,128 (Dist. Ct. Tex. 1954).
20 See Finney v. Hawkins, 189 Va. 878, 54 S.E.2d 872 (1949).
21 See Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.,
335 U.S. 525 (1949); A.F. of L. v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538
(1949).
22 Despite the all-embracing language of the statute, however, it has been
held that the prohibited clauses may be severed from a union contract, leaving
the rest of the agreement enforceable. Matter of Port Pub. Co., 231 N.C. 395,
57 S.E.2d 366 (1950). But cf. Lewis v. Jackson & Squire, Inc., 86 F. Supp.
354 (W.D. Ark. 1949).2 3 E.g., ARIZ. CODE ANN. §§ 56-1306, 56-1307 (Supp. 1952); GA. CODE ANN.
tit. 54, § 54-908 (Supp. 1951); IOWA CODE ANN. c. 736A, §736A.7 (1950)
(injunction only) ; LA. REv. STAT. tit. 23, §§ 885, 886 (Supp. 1954) ; VA. CODE
ANN. tit. 40, § 40-73 (1950) (damages only). Even though the local right-to-
work law did not specifically grant such relief, at least one state has enjoined
picketing which had as its purpose a violation of the law. See Local Union
No. 519 v. Robertson, 44 So.2d 899 (Fla. 1950).
24 Some of the states in question explicitly make a violation of their right-
to-work statute a misdemeanor. It has been held to be one even where the
statute lacks such a clause. See State v. Bishop, 228 N.C. 371, 45 S.E.2d 858
(1947).25 E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-204 (1947) (fine up to $5,000) ; TENN. CODE
ANN. § 11412.12 (Williams, Supp. 1952) (up to $500 fine and one year im-
prisonment) ; VA. CODE ANN. tit. 40, § 40-74.5 (Supp. 1954) (up to $500 fine).
Each of these statutes also provides that each day that any person or organiza-
tion remains in violation of the statute constitutes a separate offense.
26 See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, POLICY DECLARATIONS, INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS IN AMERICA 2 (1954); N.A.M., INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS POLICY
STATEMENT 7 (1954).
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servedly denounced them.2 7 Proponents of such legislation compare
union-shop contracts to the outlawed "yellow-dog" contracts of an
earlier day, in that they both make a person's continued employment
contingent on whether or not he joins a union.28 It is argued that
since union-security agreements destroy the worker's right to leave
the union without leaving the job, he is thereby deprived of his most
effective protest against bad union leadership. 29 Advocates of right-
to-work legislation deny that there can be any true collective bargain-
ing where the union members have been coerced into joining the
organization, since "[t]rue collective action is always based on the
voluntary choice of those who act." 30 It is pointed out that these
enactments represent a praiseworthy effort to revitalize states' rights
in the field of labor law.31 Finally, it is contended that they protect
the workers, since the right to work is a primary right, more essential
than any other except the right to life. To be denied the right would
condemn the worker to dependence upon the state.32
On the other hand, it is alleged that the actual purpose of such
statutes is to weaken labor unions and to lower standards of wages
and working conditions.3 3  Opponents of such legislation say that
union-security contracts stabilize labor relations,3 4 and they denounce
right-to-work laws as restrictions upon the freedom of employers and
employees to bargain as they choose.3 5 It is urged that the applica-
tion of the "states' rights" label to these laws is a fraud, since the
Taft-Hartley Law does not allow the states to pre-empt the field of
union-security regulation, but only to impose additional restrictions
upon unions.3 6 In addition, it is claimed that laws prohibiting the
union shop permit an employer to dilute union strength by replacing
union men with non-union men; 3 7 that they run counter to the Amer-
27 See A.F. OF L., THE SIGNIFICANCE OF STATE LAWS PROHIBITING UNION
SECUarY (1954); C.I.O., THE CASE AGAINST "RIGHT TO WORK" LAWS.
28 See Hartley, Comlndsory Unionimn, 12 HUMAN EvENTS No. 5 (Jan. 29,
1955); Ball, The Union Drive for Power, 2 THE FREEMAN 305, 306 (Feb. 11,
1952).
29 See Ball, supra note 28, at 307.3 0 Haney, N.Y. Journal-American, Jan. 6, 1955, p. 24, col. 7.
31 See WATTS, UNION MONOPOLY 79 (1954).
32 See Rose, The Right to Work: It Must Be Supreme over Union Security,
35 A.B.A.J. 110, 111 (1949). But see C.I.O., THE CASE AGAINST "RIGHT TO
WORK" LAWS 85, where it is asserted that in a union shop, "[tihe liberty that
the non-union man gives up is really nothing to cry about .. "3 3 See A.F. OF L., THE SIGNIFICANCE OF STATE LAWS PROHIBITING UNION
SECURITY 6 (1954); C.I.O., "RIGHT TO WoRiK" LAWS-Low WAGE SCHEME 2
(Pamphlet No. 263, 1955).
34 See C.I.O., op. cit. supra note 32, at 65. But see U.S. CHAMBER OF COM-
mER CE, THE RIGHT TO WORK 2 (Information Bulletin No. 2, 1954), wherein
it is contended that the union shop has not eliminated industrial strife in the
automobile, construction and maritime industries.
35 See statement by Secretary of Labor Mitchell, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1954,
p. 27, col. 5.
30 See C.I.O., op. cit. supra note 32, at 13-17, 96.
37 See GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 119 (1946).
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ican tradition of majority rule; 38 and that they unjustly permit some
employees to obtain the benefits of trade unionism without support-
ing it.39
Opinions also differ on whether or not the workers themselves
want union-security agreements. During the period from 1947 to
1951, when the Taft-Hartley Law required an election before a union-
shop contract could be negotiated, 91% of the votes cast favored the
union shop, and 97% of the election results authorized a union-shop
clause.40  On the other hand, it is pointed out that these votes rep-
resent only one-third of the total union membership and less than
10% of American workers.4 1  In any event, it is clear that a sub-
stantial number of employees, though probably a minority, are strongly
opposed to joining a union as a condition of continued employment.42
It is certainly arguable that numbers is no criterion in this matter
if even one citizen is deprived of a basic liberty. Since the right to
life is a basic liberty of which a citizen cannot be deprived, even in the
interests of society, and since the right to life inextricably depends
upon the right to work, it would seem that the right to work is a
basic liberty. If this be so, there is need for both a legal remedy to
redress his injury and a statutory bar to prevent its recurrence.
Moral and Economic Considerations
There can be no doubt that workers have a moral right to organ-
ize unions s. 4  As a correlative to this, it would seem that they also
have a right to refrain from doing so, in the absence of special cir-
38 See A.F. OF L., THn SIGNIFICANCE OF STATE LAWS PROHIBITING UNION
SECURITY 8-9 (1954).
39 Ibid. See C.I.O., THE CASE AGAINST "RIGHT TO WORK" LAWS 73-76.
40 See A.F. OF L., op. cit. supra note 38, at 10. It has been charged, however,
that these were hand-picked elections held only in highly organized plants where
unions felt sure of winning decisively. See N.A.M., INDUSTRY'S VIEW ON Do
WE HAVE THE RIGHT TO WORK? (Jan. 1955).
41 See N.A.M., op. cit. supra note 40.
42 For instance, 400 workers were reportedly fired by the New York Central
Railroad because they resisted compulsory unionism. See Hartley, Compulsory
Unionism, 12 HUMAN EVENTS No. 5 (Jan. 29, 1955). See also Coogan,
Election at Burroughs, 86 AMERICA 309 (Dec. 15, 1951), wherein the author
describes a recent election at the Burroughs Adding Machine Co., where, in a
95% turnout, the employees voted by a ratio of five to one against organizing
into a union. See also the excerpts from communications from union members
protesting compulsory unionism, contained in Appendix A to the statement of
George W. Armstrong, Jr., before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, March 26, 1953.
43 See Encyclical Quadragesnte Anno, translated in PEais, THE WIsDOM
OF CATHOLICISM 715, 724-726 (1949) passim. See also RYAN AND BOLAND,
CATHOLIC PRINCIPLES OF POLITICS 150, 151 (1950), quoting a statement by the
Archbishops and Bishops of the Administrative Board of the National Catholic
Welfare Conference.
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cumstances affecting the common good.44  This general subject has
been recently illuminated in a statement by Pope Pius XII. In speak-
ing of the burdens which today afflict the consciences of men, His
Holiness employed the following language:
Again, access to employment or places of labor is made to depend on
registration in certain parties or in organizations which deal with the distribu-
tion of employment.
Such discrimination is indicative of an inexact concept of the proper func-
tion of labor unions and their proper purpose, which is the protection of the
interests of the salaried worker within modern society, which is becoming more
and more anonymous and collectivist.
In fact, is not the essential purpose of unions the practical affirmation that
man is the subject, and not the object of social relations?
Is it not to protect the individual against collective irresponsibility of
anonymous proprietors? Is it not to represent the person of the worker against
those who are inclined to consider him merely a productive agent with a certain
price value?
How, therefore, can it be considered normal that the protection of the
personal rights of the worker be more and more in the hands of an anonymous
group, working through the agency of immense organizations which are of
their very nature monopolies? The worker, thus wronged in the exercise of
his personal rights, will surely find especially painful the oppression of his
liberty and of his conscience, caught as he is in the wheels of a gigantic social
machine.45
It is respectfully suggested that appropriate legislation to rectify the
evils alluded to by His Holiness may properly take the form of the
state enactments which are the subject of this note.46
It is sometimes contended that the union shop elevates wage
levels, and that right-to-work laws therefore tend to lower the gen-
eral standard of living 4 7 This position is a consequence of the belief
44 See editorial, 86 AMERICA 346 (Dec. 29, 1951). See also Encyclical
Quadragesimo Anno, supra note 43, wherein Pope Pius XI emphasized that
workers are "free to institute these unions," but did not indicate that they were
obligated to institute them. Instead, His Holiness compared them to those
municipal associations ". . . which various individuals are free to join or
not. . . ." Id. at 744 (emphasis added).
45 See the 1952 Christmas Eve Message of Pope Pius XII, reported in
The Tablet, Jan. 3, 1953, p. 9, col. 2.
46 For a recent discussion of the right-to-work laws in connection with
Catholic principles, see Byrd, A Laboring Man Looks at Labor, The Tablet,
March 19, 1955, p. 4, cols. 5-7. The author, a student of Catholic social and
industrial relations for many years, therein indicates that such statutes are
desirable in the light of recent Papal statements, including that quoted in the
text. Other Catholic scholars, however, oppose right-to-work laws. See, e.g.,
Cronin, Right-to-Work Laws Are Strongly Opposed, The Tablet, March 19,
1955, p. 4, cols. 1-4. Father Cronin disapproves of such statutes on the ground
that union-security contracts often conform to the moral principle that the
common good must prevail over the interest of the individual. He concludes
that the union shop is "a legitimate feature of union organization." Id. at col. 4.
47 See C.I.O., THE CAsE AGAINST "RIGHT TO WORK" LAws 29-30.
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that wage rates are dependent upon the power of labor unions to en-
force their demands.48 Actually, economists hold that union pressure,
ordinarily, ". . . cannot be depended upon to raise the standard of
living of the community as a whole, to increase the share of the
national income going to union members, or to increase the average
income of union members relative to the incomes of other members
of the community." 49 This does not mean that unions serve no useful
economic function, however. In specific instances they perform an
important service for their members by assuring that they obtain the
true market value of their labor, since the individual worker other-
wise might, through ignorance, work for less than his labor is actually
worth8 0 In addition, they have often been instrumental in compelling
employers to establish wholesome working conditions for their em-
ployees. 51 However, it would not seem that a union shop is a neces-
sary prerequisite to the successful performance of these functions.
5 2
While it would be outside the scope of this article to attempt an
analysis of the effect of right-to-work laws on living standards in the
states where they are in force, it would appear that in no event can
they have any lasting depressive effect on wage levels in the American
labor market as it is presently organized.
Conclusion
The power which the Federal Government possesses in the field
of labor relations is so extensive that some have regarded it as ex-
clusive.55  This immense authority is entirely drawn from the judicial
construction which has been placed upon the constitutional grant of
power to Congress,
48 See, e.g., Note, 28 IND. L.J. 355, 361 (1953) wherein this view is expressed.
49 SLICHTER, THE CHALLENGE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 95 (1947). See
that author's discussion of the effect of unions upon wage rates. Id. at 71-98.
See also VON MisFs, HUMAN AcTION 591, 763-773 (1949) wherein it is dem-
onstrated that the determination of wage rates can ultimately only be achieved
on the open market, and that unions cannot raise wages above the market rate
for the country as a whole without causing unemployment. It is certainly not
necessary that there be trade unions for wages to rise. For instance, wage
scales advanced in the period 1820-1860, although unions were almost unknown.
See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 7
(Bulletin No. 1000, 1950).
50 See HAZLIrr, ECONOMICS IN ONE LESSON 124-125 (Foundation for Eco-
nomic Education ed. 1952).
51 Id. at 134.
52 The union could clearly disseminate information concerning wage rates
even though not all the workers in a place of employment were union members.
It is also difficult to see how it would be hampered in its effort to establish
better working conditions by the fact that a few employees had not joined.
In fact, their failure to join would seem to indicate that they did not feel
particularly aggrieved at the prevailing conditions.
53 See Cox and Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HARV. L. REV.
211, 212 (1950). This point of view has been warmly assailed. See Petro,
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To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes.
5 4
It is only in the past twenty years that Congress has asserted that
the commerce clause empowered it to regulate the labor market. Until
1935, it had left employers and employees virtually to their own de-
vices in compromising their differences, subject only to the rules laid
down by the courts. 5 The passage of the Wagner Act " in that year
signified a determination on the part of the Federal Government to
intervene actively in labor matters. This meant, of course, that the
states would lose much of their power to regulate in the field.5 7 With
the inclusion in the Taft-Hartley Law of Section 14(b), by which
the states were allowed to pass laws regulating union security, it
appeared that Congress had decided upon a partial return to the prin-
ciple of state control of labor relations. In reality, however, no real
shift of power has transpired, since the states are only permitted to
legislate at the pleasure of Congress, which may repeal Section 14(b)
whenever it chooses.
The phenomenal growth of the American trade union move-
ment r's has created those problems which necessarily attend any con-
centration of power. The possibility that trade unions will obtain a
monopoly over the employment opportunities for millions of Amer-
icans has become so imminent that legislative recourse is necessary
to insure the survival of competition in the labor market.5 9 The Papal
Participation by the State in the Enforcement and Development of National
Labor Policy, 28 NOrR DAmE LAW. 1 (1952).
54 U.S. CONsT. Art. I, § 8.
55 See Cox and Seidman, stpra note 53, at 211. One important exception
to the general laissez-faire policy of Congress in labor disputes was the enact-
ment of the Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 STAT. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 151
et seq. (1952). This Act was sustained as a proper exercise of the commerce
power in Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship
Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
5649 STAT. 449 (1935). The Act was held constitutional in NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
57 Initially, some states sought to assume jurisdiction in cases affecting
interstate commerce where the National Labor Relations Board had not inter-
vened. See Cox and Seidman, supra; note 53, at 212. The Supreme Court
rejected this approach, however, holding that the states were excluded from
industries where the Board customarily exercises jurisdiction. La Crosse Tele-
phone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 18 (1949).
See also Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board,
330 U.S. 767 (1947).
58 Today there are some 140,000 collective bargaining agreements in force,
covering some 17 million workers. Union-security clauses are found in 75%
of these contracts. In recent years the Bureau of Labor Statistics has observed
a tendency to include union-shop provisions, rather than the less strict mainte-
nance of membership and bargaining agent clauses. See CCH, UNION CON-
TRACT CLAusEs 26 (1954).
59 But see GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 416-423 (1946), wherein the author
denies the practical possibility of restricting unions, and foresees a possible end
to the competitive economic system.
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message previously quoted,60 while asserting the morality of the proper
activities of labor unions, was directed at monopolistic tendencies on
the part of particular labor organizations. It would seem that prac-
tices presently engaged in by certain American labor unions come
within this classification. 61 The right-to-work type of statute merits
consideration as a step toward the elimination of abuses which are
engendered by union-security agreements. 62 In addition, it represents
a wholesome return to state control over labor relations, albeit this
power is embodied in a retractable grant from Congress. As to the
latter point, it is imperative that federal and state legislators should
begin to envision the feasibility of a constitutional amendment which
will insure that state legislation in the field of labor relations cannot
be nullified by Congress. In the meanwhile, it is to be hoped that
the New York State Legislature will take under advisement the ques-
tion of whether or not a right-to-work law is desirable for the pro-
tection of non-union workers in this state.
M
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Introduction
Although the legal profession has admirably served the public
on the national and state levels of government,' the recent Survey
60 See p. 263 supra.
61 Thus, the Motion Picture Machine Operators frequently admit only sons
or close relatives of members; the Brewers exclude new members unless jobs
are available; and the Locomotive Firemen and the Boilermakers discriminate
against negroes. See Summers, Union Powers and Workers' Rights, 49 MIcn.
L. REv. 805, 821 (1951). Some unions have the power to expel members for
reasons not connected with union activity. See Summers, Disciplinary Powers
of Unions, 3 IND. & L. REL. REv. 483, 492-493 (1950). In industries where
union-security contracts predominate, expulsion may bar a worker from his
trade. See Summers, Disciplinary Procedures of Unions, 4 IND. & L. REL.
REv. 15, 28 (1950).
62 See, e.g., Lawrence, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Feb. 4, 1955, p. 15, col. 1,
wherein the author relates the recent action of a union leader in Pennsylvania
who threatened 2,900 members with unemployment unless they registered to
vote in a public election. If Pennsylvania had a right-to-work law, no such
incident could have occurred.
I See BLAUSTEIN AND PORTER WITH DUNCAN, THE AMERICAN LAWYER
97-103 (1954).
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